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THE OPTIMAL PRORABILITY AND MAGNITUDE OF FINES FOR
ACTS THAT AREDEFINITELYUNDESIRABLE
ABSTRACT
Even when society would wish to deter all acts of some type, suchas tax
evasion and many common crimes, the benefits from deterrence often will be
insufficient t-justifythe expenditures on enforcement that would be required
to deter everyone. If some individuals are not deterred, however, they will
bear risk when fines are employed as a sanction. As a result, itmay be
optimal to reduce total risk-bearing costs by reducing the number of
individuals who bear any risk. This can be accomplished by increasing
enforcement above the level that would be justified consideringonly the
benefits of deterrence and the direct costs of enforcement. Another
possibility is that it may be optimal reduce the risk borne by those who act,
by employing fines below the maximum feasible level. This latter result
constitutes an instance in which the well-known implication of Becker's





Cambridge, MA 02138Society wishes to deter all individuals from committing some types of
acts, such as tax evasion and many common crimes, for which the harm done
exceeds any legitimate private benefits. Because enforcement is costly,
however, complete deterrence often will not be desirable, at least on
deterrence grounds alone. Individuals who are not deterred will bear the risk
of sanctions --herefines. If individuals are risk-averse, risk-bearing
costs are incurred and must be taken into account in determining optimal
enforcement policy.
One strategy would be to. reduce the risk borne by those who are not
deterred. Thus, it may be optimal to employ fines below the maximum feasible
level, perhaps at the same time spending more on enforcement to maintain
deterrence. This latter prescription is contrary to the well-known
suggestion, with roots in Becker's (1968) analysis, that optimal enforcement
involves achieving the appropriate expected sanction through a fine that isas
high as possible (equal to a person's entire wealth) and a probability of
detection that is correspondingly low, so as to economize on enforcement
costs.1 This motivation for less-than-extreme sanctions supplements the
previously developed argument of Polinsky and Shavell (1979) addressed to the
case in which some individuals ideally are not deterred, such as those who
efficiently breach contracts or who are subject to strict liability for their
acts. Their argument and that developed here each offer reasons why, even
when enforcement is optimal, individuals will commit acts and thus bear risk.
Another strategy to reduce total risk-bearing costs would be to reduce the
number of individuals who bear any risk. Thismay be accomplished by
increasing enforcement beyond the level that would be justified basedupon aconsideration of only the benefits of deterrence and direct costs of
enforcement. In some cases, complete deterrence may be optimal in light of
the benefits of eliminating all risk-bearing costs.
Section 1 presents the model, which is analyzed in section 2. Section 3
comments on the significance of the results.
1. The Model
Individuals decide whether to commit a harmful act based on whether it
will maximize their expected utility. Individuals' benefits from committing
the act differ, and are not observable by the social authority. Acts are
subject to fines, which are imposed with some probability.2 Fines cannot
exceed individuals' available wealth. Enforcement is financed by fine
revenues and a lump-sum tax. The following notation is employed:
htotal harm caused by each act, borne evenly by all individuals.3
b —benefitto an individual from committing the act.'
f(.) —distribution(continuous or discrete) of b on [O,hl.
F(.) —cumulativedistribution function for f(S).
U—utilityof wealth.
y —initialwealth.
2 It is assumed that individuals cannot insure against the fine. If they
could insure at an actuarially fair rate, individuals intending to act would
purchase complete coverage, making the analysis as in the risk-neutral case.
This may increase achievable welfare by eliminating risk-bearing costs. (In
example 1, below, although the optimum involves no risk-bearing costs when
individuals were risk-averse, greater enforcement costs were incurred to deter
acts that produced no net social harm.) In addition, the availability of
insurance may reduce achievable welfare, because risk-aversion allows a given
level of deterrence to be achieved at a lower probability of detection. (In
example 1, below, if one assumes instead that a —.3,full deterrence could be
achieved at a probability below .0075, implying an enforcement cost less than
that required to deter only the low-harm types when individuals are risk-
neutral.)
One can imagine an externality with such a property or that the harm is
borne with equal probability by all individuals, with individuals purchasing
actuarially fair insurance.
'Theanalysis, for the most part, assumes that both b and h are monetizable
--thatis, they are to be taken into account in computing the maximum
feasible fine. All the results hold if either or both factors are
nonmonetizable.
-2-— fine.
p —probabilitythat an individual who commits the act is fined.
c(p) —costof enforcement; c' > 0, c" > 0.
t —lump-sumtax.
Begin by considering an individual's maximization problem. For those who
do not act, wealth is given by
(1) x —y
-t-(1-F(b*))h,
which is initial wealth minus the tax owed minus the harm caused. The portion
who are deterred is F(b*), where b* refers to the type of individual who is
just indifferent between acting and not acting -- thatis, the type for whom
(2) (l-p)U(x + b) + pU(x + b -it)U(x).
Given b*, the expected utility if one acts (the left side of (2)) is
increasing in b and the utility if one does not act (the right side) is
independent of b, so all individuals for whom b > b* will act and all for whom
b < b* will not act.5
The social authority, which does not observe individuals' types,6 chooses
p and ittomaximize social welfare, defined as the sum of individuals'
expected utilities,7
There need not exist or be a unique b* that solves (2).(Existence is the
lesser complication as, for b* —0,the right side of (2) is greater the left,
and conversely for b* ￿ it,sothere will exist a b* with the properties
described in text even if (2) does not hold for such a b*.) For the risk-
neutral case and the constant absolute risk aversion utility function used to
prove the results, however, there exists a unique b*.
6 lt is obvious that, when it would be ideal forsome individuals to engage
in an activity, it would be optimal to excuse them from sanctions whenever
sanctions are costly -- andimposing risk is a relevant cost. The results
here imply that, for the same reason, if individuals' types could be observed,
it would tend to be optimal to excuse even those who, ideally, should not act,
if their benefits are high enough that they are not deterred at the optimum. Inaddition to avoiding the risk-bearing costs at a given p and it,onecould
raise itandlower p, thus achieving more cost-effective deterrence.
For the discrete case, substitute the summationforthe integral.
-3-b* h
(3) W —5 U(x)f(b)db+ 5[(l-p)U(x+ b) + pU(x + b -r)]f(b)db,
0 b*
subject to the constraints that the lump-sum tax finances the required




and that the fine not exceed individuals' available wealth. The maximum




where b* refers to the type of individual who is just indifferent at p,
This simply is initial wealth minus the tax and harm imposed, plus the benefit
of the marginal individual.8 This formulation assumes that the harm and
benefit are both monetizable.9
Before proceeding, it is helpful to consider briefly the (admittedly
unrealistic) case in which there is no limit on the maximum feasible fine.
For any given fine and probability of detection, one can reduce enforcement
costs while achieving the same degree of deterrence by reducing the
probability of detection and increasing the fine by an appropriate amount.
Thus, it will be optimal to deter everyone at negligible cost with a
vanishingly small probability and a correspondingly high fine)0 Because all
individuals are deterred at the optimum, no risk is borne. This result
contrasts with that of Polinsky and Shavell (1979) because they examined acts
8 See Kaplow (198gb, note 26) with regard to the statement of the maximum
feasible fine as being the same for all types of individuals.
This may be appropriate for instances such as tax evasion, where the harm
may derive from higher payments required from some other tax and the benefits
may be saved taxes net of resources expended in evasion. All the results hold
if either or both are not monetizable.
10 To demonstrate this, note first that, forany p >0,the optimal fine is
any that is sufficiently high to deter everyone: A lower fine would result in
some net harm, in which case aggregate expected income would be lower and it
would not be distributed equally (whereas, when all are deterred, all have
equal income); thus, with concave utility, welfare must be lower. Given that
all are deterred, from (3) one has, for p > 0, dW/dp —-c'U'<0.Finally,
for p sufficiently small (but positive), welfare must exceed that at p —0so
long as all the population (except a group of measure zero) is not of type
-4-for which some individuals benefited by more than the harm caused; in that
case, the optimum in the risk-neutral case involved a sanction sufficient to
deter only those whose act caused more harm than benefit. When individuals
are risk-averse, the risk-neutral solution --inwhich individuals with high
benefits continue to act -- entailssuch individuals bearing risk. Taking
this cost into account can produce qualitatively different results. It might
have appeared that the existence of "desirable illegal acts" was necessary for
this issue to arise. In fact, however, a constraint on the maximum feasible
sanction (which in practice will always exist) is sufficient to yield
fundamentally different results.
2. Analysis
This section begins by stating the results and discussing the intuition
for each. Then the propositions are demonstrated by constructing two discrete
examples having the required properties." The case when individuals are
risk-neutral is examined briefly because the solution of that case isolates
the benefits of deterrence and costs of enforcement. Differences in the
optimum when individuals are risk-averse can thus to attributed to risk
aversion rather than to other considerations.
A. Results
(1) When individuals are risk-averse, a probability of detection
sufficient to deter all individuals may be optimal even when full deterrence
would not be optimal if individuals were risk-neutral. In such a case, the
optimal probability will be the lowest for which full deterrence is feasible
and the optimal fine will be the maximum feasible fine (equal to total
wealth). (See example 1.)When individualsare risk-neutral, it is not
optimal to deter those with benefits sufficiently close to the level of harm,
because the benefits of deterrence become arbitrarily small while the marginal
"Thecontinuous case, examined in Kaplow (l989b), is substantially more
complex, but in ways that do not affect the basic results; thus, it is not
examined here.
-5-cost of deterrence does not. When individuals are risk-averse, however,
increased deterrence reduces the number of individuals who bear risk and thus
may justify expenditures that are not justified on deterrence grounds alone.
In particular, deterring all individuals may be optimal because, at the
margin, the savings in risk-bearing costs are positive, and thus may exceed
the positive marginal enforcement costs.'2 And, if it is optimal to deter all
individuals, the most efficient way to accomplish this will involve employing
the lowest probability for which this is feasible and the maximum feasible
fine. This extreme sanction will impose no risk-bearing costs because no one
ever bears the sanction.
(2) When individuals are risk-averse, it may be optimal to deter some but
not all individuals. When this is the case, it may be optimal to impose a
fine lower than the maximum feasible fine. (See example 2.) Because
expenditures on enforcement are subject to diminishing returns, it may be that
the harm of an act is sufficiently great to justify some expenditures on
enforcement (despite the imposition of risk-bearing costs) while the costs of
complete deterrence are sufficiently high that the result in (1) will not
hold. Thus, partial deterrence may be optimal. In such instances, undeterred
individuals bear risk, so it may be efficient to spend additional resources to
reduce risk-bearing costs. For a given level of deterrence, risk-bearing
costs may be reduced by decreasing the fine and correspondingly increasing the
probability of detection, the latter entailing enforcement costs. Whether a
fine below the maximum feasible level will be optimal depends on whether the
marginal savings in risk-bearing costs exceed the required marginal increase
in enforcement resources.
(3) When individuals are risk-averse, optimal enforcement may involve a
higher or lower probability of detection, a higher or lower fine, and a higher
12Thisanalysis implies that, even if some individuals' benefits exceed
harm, but not by a significant amount, it may be optimal to deter them:
marginal deterrence benefits would be negative, rather than zero as in the
case in text, and marginal enforcement costs would be positive, but the sum of
these effects could still be less than the marginal savings in risk-bearing
costs. This result and that in text is analogous to the suggestion in
Polinsky and Shavell (1984) that when imprisonment (which is socially costly
to impose) is the sanction, overdeterrence may be optimal because it decreases
sanctioning costs.
-6-or lower level of deterrence than when individuals are risk-neutral. A higher
probability of detection may be optimal than when individuals are risk-neutral
either because of the benefits from reducing risk-bearing costs when only some
are to be deterred, as described in the discussion of (2),' or in order to
deter more individuals to reduce the portion of the population subject to
risk-bearing costs, as noted in the discussion of (1). A lower probability
may be optimal because one can achieve equivalent or greater deterrence at
lower probabilities when individuals are risk-averse. (See example 2.)
A lower fine may be optimal when individuals are risk-averse in order to
reduce risk-bearing costs, as discussed with result (2). A higher finemay be
optimal despite the fact that the risk-neutral case involves imposition of the
maximum feasible fine, because the maximum feasible fine when individuals are
risk-averse may be greater. (See example 1.14)
Greater deterrence may be optimal when individuals are risk-averse
because, as described in result (1), a lower fraction of the population is
subject to risk-bearing costs. Because all are deterred when result (1)
applies, there does not exist the countervailing effect that those not
deterred would incur greater risk-bearing costs. This latter effect suggests
that lower deterrence also may be optimal when individuals are risk-averse.'5
B. Examples
For each, choose parameters and functions as follows:
h 1.
bE (.1, 1).
f is discrete; f(.l) .9, f(l) =.1.
' In example 2, a higherprobability than when individuals are risk-neutral
is not required to accomplish this because of the strength of the
countervailing effect noted in the text to follow. For different parameter
values, a higher probability may be necessary for this reason. See Kaplow
(1989b).
14 Because more harm isprevented and the type just indifferent is higher
when deterrence is higher, the maximum feasible fine is higherdespite greater enforcement costs and lower fine revenue.
15 That lower deterrencemay be optimal is the only result not illustrated by
either example. For a demonstration of this possibility, seeKaplow (1989b).
-7-w if individuals are risk-neutral,
U(w) —
a—.1,if individuals are risk-averse (constant
absolute risk aversion utility function).
y —12.
Example 1: c(p) —
Individualsare risk-neutral: When individuals are risk-neutral, it is
familiarthatthe maximum feasible fine is optimal, for otherwise one could
increase the fine and reduce the probability of detection, keeping pir
constant, which would reduce enforcement costs without changing behavior.
Thus, all that remains is to determine the optimal level of enforcement.
Clearly, it is not optimal to deter individuals for whom b —1,for their
benefit equals the harm caused, and additional resources must be expended to
deter them. Thus, the optimum entails b* —.1or b* —0.For the former, the
result is p .0083, 12.01. At this p, c .000000004, which is less than
the net benefit of .81 from deterring individuals for whom b —.1,so this is
the optimum. (The net harm caused by each is h -b—1-.1—.9and they
constitute .9 of the population.)
Individuals are risk-averse: For the stated utility function, using (2),
the marginal type can be expressed as
(6) e* —1-p+pe.
If all are to be deterred, the maximum feasible fine is optimal for the same
reason as when individuals are risk-neutral. (Since all are deterred, the
high fine does not result in any risk-bearing costs.) For the parameters
given, one has p =.0394, 13. Enforcement costs are approximately
.0000024. Because the net harm avoided, as when individuals are risk-neutral,
is .81, this option is superior to deterring no one. (Aggregate expected
income is greater and it is distributed equally.) The other possibility is to
deter only individuals for whom b* —.1.If that is optimal, one should
select a probability and fine so that, in (6), one just has b* —.1,for if b*
were greater one could reduce r and impose less risk. For b* —. 1to be
superior to b* —1,the savings in enforcement costs would have to exceed the
resulting risk-bearing costs. At b* —.1,however, total risk-bearing costs
-8-must exceed .001 if any enforcement costs are to be saved, so this is not
possible.'6 Thus, it is optimal to deter all individuals --includingthe
type that causes no net harm -.toavoid risk-bearing costs.
Example 2: c(p) —(25p)4
Individuals are risk-neutral: As before, the possible optima are b* —0
and b* —.1.For the latter, one has p .00833, 12.01, incurring
enforcement costs under .002. Net harm averted is .81, so again the optimum
involves deterring the lr'w-benefit types.
Individuals are risk-averse: To deter everyone requires a probability in
excess of .0394, which costs more than .94. As the total (not net) harm
averted is 1, the net gain is under .06, which is less than the forgone
benefits of both types from acting. Thus, deterring no one is pareto superior
to deterring everyone. At b*.1, one can compute that the optimal policy is
p .006, r9.84. Because this involves costs of approximately .0005, and
saves harm of .9, both groups are better off than if no one is deterred.
(Type .1 saves harm of .9 and loses a benefit of .1 and pays a tax less than
the cost of .0005. Type 1 saves harm of .9, pays a tax less than .0005, and
is subject to a fine with a money-equivalent cost of .1 with this utility
function.'7) Interestingly, the optimal fine of 9.84 is less than the maximum
feasible fine at this probability, which is approximately 11.9. The reason is
that reducing ir while increasing p in a manner that maintains the same
deterrence reduces risk-bearing costs. The optimal fine is not even lower
than 9.84 because increasing p also raises enforcement costs. The
16 For a given b*, risk-bearing costsare reduced as p is increased and ir is
correspondingly reduced. If p exceeds .0394, however, there is no savings in
enforcement costs, so deterring everyone (which entails no risk-bearing costs)
would be superior. At p —.04,the necessary fine to deter type .1 is
approximately 2.24. The certain reduction in income for type 1 individuals
making them indifferent to pir is, with this utility function, simply b*. The
difference between that reduction (.1 in this instance) and the transfer
(pir —.04x 2.24 —.0896)of .0104 is the risk-bearing cost incurred by .1 of
the population, so total risk-bearing costs exceed .00104. (Note that
deterring only the type with b —. 1also entails an unequal distribution of
income which, with concave utility, reduces welfare further.)
17See note 16.
-9-intermediate result (fine below maximum feasible fine, probability less than
one) reflects the optimal trade-off of these factors.
3. Concluding Remarks
(a) For many crimes, tax evasion, and some other acts, it would be ideal
(or, at least, approximately so) for no individuals to commit the acts. It is
often the case, however, that a probability sufficient to deter all
individuals would be extremely expensive. If partial deterrence is thus
employed, undeterred individuals bear risk. Optimal enforcement policy will
take this cost into account. One strategy involves reducing the number of
individuals who bear risk by increasing enforcement above the level that would
be warranted based on considerations of deterrence and enforcement costs
alone. As in one of the examples presented, it even may be optimal on these
grounds to expend resources to deter individuals whose acts produce benefits
equal to their social costs.
Another strategy involves reducing the risk borne by individuals who are
not deterred. Thus, it may be optimal to employ fines below the maximum
feasible level, possibly with corresponding increases in enforcement
expenditures. This result is similar to that in Polinsky and Shavell (1979),
where the reason some individuals optimally were not deterred was that
socially beneficial acts as well as harmful ones were subject to sanctions (as
in the case of breach of contract and acts subject to strict liability). For
most offenses, one indeed observes fines far less than most violators' wealth.
While consistent with the results presented here and in Polinsky and Shavell,
these practices are unlikely to be justified by the concern for avoiding risk-
bearing costs in contexts in which the fine is so low that the marginal risk-
bearing costs from a slightly higher fine would be trivial.
(b) In light of this analysis, it seems inappropriate when analyzing
optimal enforcement policy simply to assume, as is commonly done, that the
fine is fixed at some stated level -- whetheran absolute amount or some rate
to be multiplied by a measure of the severity of the infraction.'8 The
-10-optimal fine will be a function of the other instrumentsunder study, and the
entire character of the optimum with regard to otherinstruments (here, the
probability of detection) may differ when the fine is setoptimally rather
than stipulated.
(c) Many explanations have been offered for thecommonly observed practice
of using fines far below individuals' wealth. Mostprominent is the notion
that fines must in some sense be proportional to the harmcaused by an
activity. See Stern (1978). Usually, little normative defense is offeredfor
such claims and the appropriate proportion is unstated.Actual practice
varies widely in this respect. For example, a $10 fine forfailing to put l0
in a parking meter is a fine of 10,000%; civil tax fraud(not mere mistake or
negligence) -- whichmost would consider a worse offense -- hasa fine, in
addition to repayment, of under 100%. Doubleparking may be subject to a fine
of $30, an infinite percent of the actual harm causedin many instances. If a
serious accident results and one is successfully sued fornegligence, one
might have to pay $1,000,000 --whichis no penalty beyond actual harm caused
but a penalty of, perhaps, more than 3,000,000% of theexpected harm. Thus,
it is extremely difficult to infer from actualpractice the content of this
proportionality concept. Nonetheless, it seems that such beliefs are
widespread.
A less frequent, but quite plausible explanation for moderatepenalties is
that some offenses are committed by mistake.'9 Onemay forget to put money in
a parking meter or not understand the income tax rule one violated infiling a
tax return. In such instances, high finesmay have little additional
18It is not obvious that a wealth constraint wouldjustify a constant
penalty rate. Moreover, when there is no limit to the severity of the
infraction, or the only limit (as with tax evasion) is one's wealth,a
constant penalty rate is infeasible.
19 See Kaplow (l989a)on this case. Another reason sometimes offered for
moderate fines is that marginal deterrence must bepreserved. This is at best
a weak argument even against fines approaching total wealth,as imprisonment
remains available. In addition, for fines well less than totalwealth but far
above currently observed fines, it is difficult to understandthe marginal deterrence problem. Since the fine is only imposed whenindividuals are
detected, and in many instances apprehension and collection could follow
almost immediately and automatically, one doesnot confront the problems that arise in such cases as the kidnapper who, faced withcapital punishment for the offense, may be left with little incentivenot to kill the victim.
-11-deterrent effect but impose great risk on violators. If there is a
significant group who make such mistakes -- or,alternatively, who act
intentionally but mistakenly underestimate the fine or probability of
detection --avery high fine could produce substantial risk-bearing costs.
The more efficient policy may be to expend more resources on detection and
impose lower penalties, even to such a degree that some intentional and
informed violators will remain undeterred. Note that this explanation has
much in common with that explored in the model here. One could, in principle,
expend enough resources ;o educate the entire population so that few made
mistakes.2° But this often would be quite costly. The uninformed group is
much like those individuals in the model here that had high private benefits
and thus remain undeterred at the optimum, even though they were assumed to be
fully aware of the consequences.
20 Hiher penalties might induce individuals to be more careful or to learn
more about applicable rules, but such responses are themselves costly and may
be incomplete.
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